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Abstract
A recent source of concern for the security of
neural networks is the emergence of clean-label
dataset poisoning attacks, wherein correctly la-
beled poisoned samples are injected in the training
dataset. While these poisons look legitimate to the
human observer, they contain malicious character-
istics that trigger a targeted misclassification dur-
ing inference. We propose a scalable and transfer-
able clean-label attack, Bullseye Polytope, which
creates poison images centered around the target
image in the feature space. Bullseye Polytope im-
proves the attack success rate of the current state-
of-the-art by 26.75% in end-to-end training, while
increasing attack speed by a factor of 12. We fur-
ther extend Bullseye Polytope to a more practical
attack model by including multiple images of the
same object (e.g., from different angles) in craft-
ing the poisoned samples. We demonstrate that
this extension improves attack transferability by
over 16% to unseen images (of the same object)
without increasing the number of poisons.
1. Introduction
Machine-learning-based systems are being increasingly de-
ployed in security-critical applications such as face recogni-
tion (Parkhi et al., 2015; Sun et al., 2014), fingerprint iden-
tification (Wang et al., 2014), cybersecurity (Suciu et al.,
2018), as well as applications with high cost of failure such
as autonomous driving (Chen et al., 2015). The existence
of adversarial examples in deep neural networks has raised
serious doubt on the security of these systems (Goodfellow
et al., 2014; Biggio et al., 2013; Szegedy et al., 2013). In
these evasion attacks (adversarial examples), a targeted in-
put is perturbed by imperceptible amounts at test time in
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order to avoid detection or trigger misclassification by a
trained network. But neural networks are also vulnerable to
malicious manipulation during the training process.
As neural networks often require large datasets for training,
it is common practice to use training samples collected from
other, often untrusted, sources (e.g., the Internet), and it is
expensive to have these datasets carefully vetted. While
neural networks are strong enough to learn powerful models
in the presence of natural noises, they are vulnerable to
carefully crafted malicious noise introduced deliberately by
adversaries. In particular, gathering data from untrusted
sources makes neural networks susceptible to data poi-
soning attacks, where an adversary injects data into the
training set to manipulate or degrade the system perfor-
mance. Unlike adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al.,
2014; Biggio et al., 2013; Szegedy et al., 2013) and back-
door attacks (Chen et al., 2017a; Turner et al., 2018; Liu
et al., 2017), data poisoning attacks do not modify the target
sample during inference.
This work focuses on clean-label poisoning attacks, a
branch of poisoning attacks wherein the attacker does not
have any control over the labeling process. In this threat
model, the poisoned samples are created by introducing im-
perceptible yet malicious alterations that will result in model
misbehavior in response to specific target inputs. These per-
turbations are small enough to maintain the original images’
labels in the eye of a domain expert. The stealth of the attack
increases the success rate in real-world scenarios compared
to other types of data poisoning attacks, as the poisoned
data (1) will not be identified by human labelers, and (2)
does not degrade test accuracy except for misclassification
of particular target examples.
Clean-label poisoning attack on transfer learning was first
studied in the white-box setting (Shafahi et al., 2018) where
the attacker has complete knowledge of the pre-trained net-
work φ that the victim employs to either (1) extract features
for training a (linear) classifier (linear transfer learning) or
(2) fine-tunes on a similar task (end-to-end training). The
Feature Collision attack (Shafahi et al., 2018) selects a base
image xb from the (intended) misclassification class and
creates a poison sample, xp, by adding small (bounded)
adversarial perturbations to xb such that xp is similar to the
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
00
19
1v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  1
 M
ay
 20
20
Bullseye Polytope: A Scalable Clean-Label Poisoning Attack with Improved Transferability
target image in the feature space created by φ. Feature Colli-
sion tends to fail in gray-box or black-box settings where the
feature extractor φ is unknown to the attacker. To mitigate
limitations of Feature Collision, Convex Polytope was pro-
posed (Zhu et al., 2019), which, instead of finding poisons
close to the target, finds a set of poisons that form a convex
polytope around it, hoping that the target’s feature vector
lies within (or at least close to) this “attack zone” in the
victim’s feature space. This is a far more relaxed condition
than what is enforced by Feature Collision, as it enables the
poisons to lie much further away from the target. Convex
Polytope relies on the fact that every linear classifier that
classifies a set of points into label l will also classify every
point in the convex hull of these points as label l.
The most important advantage of Convex Polytope to Fea-
ture Collision is improved transferability of the targeted mis-
classification to the victim’s (fine-tuned) classifier, where
the feature extractor φ is unknown to the attacker. How-
ever, as we show here, the target feature vector in Convex
Polytope tends to be close to the boundary of the attack
zone, potentially hampering the transferability of the attack.
Another major downside of Convex Polytope is that it is
very slow. For example, crafting a set of five poisons for a
single target takes ∼17 hours on average.1 This poses a seri-
ous bottleneck for future research, especially for designing
defenses against this class of attacks.
To address these limitations, we propose Bullseye Polytope,
which modifies the constraints of Convex Polytope such
that the target is pushed toward the “center” of the attack
zone (i.e., convex hull of poisons). The geometrical compar-
ison of Bullseye Polytope and Convex Polytope is shown
in Figure 1. Bullseye Polytope improves both the transfer-
ability and speed of convergence compared to the state of
the art. When the victim adopts linear transfer learning,
our method improves the attack transferability by 7.44%
on average, while being 11x faster. In end-to-end training,
Bullseye Polytope outperforms Convex Polytope by 26.75%
in terms of attack success rate, while being 12x faster. In a
more restricted threat model where the adversary has lim-
ited knowledge of the training set of the victim’s feature
extractor φ, Bullseye Polytope increases attack success rate
in linear transfer learning by 9.27%.
We also extend Bullseye Polytope to a more practical threat
model. Current clean-label poisoning attacks are designed
to target only one image at a time, rendering them ineffec-
tive against unpredictable variations in real-world image
acquisition. Such attacks disregard the following major
point: to succeed in real-world scenarios, the attack needs
to cope with a spectrum of test inputs. By including a larger
number of target images (of the same object) when crafting
the poisons, we are able to obtain attack transferability of
1Graphics cards are used for all experiments.
(a) Original images. (b) Convex Polytope (c) Bullseye Polytope
Figure 1. Simplified representation of poisons crafted by Convex
Polytope and Bullseye Polytope in two-dimensional feature space.
Blue circles are poisons and the red circle is the target. Convex
Polytope moves poisons until the target is inside their convex hull,
making no further refinements to move the target away from the
polytope boundary, whereas Bullseye Polytope pushes the target
toward the polytope center.
49.56% against unseen images (of the same object), with-
out increasing the number of poisons. This is over 16%
improvement compared to single-target mode when testing
against the same set of images (in linear transfer learning).
Our experiments show that Bullseye Polytope is not only
more successful than current state-of-the-art of clean-label
poisoning attacks, but, perhaps more importantly, it is an
order of magnitude faster. When building future defenses
against this class of attacks, being able to run the attack
in a short time makes a huge difference. In this light, our
work not only improves the state of the art, but also facili-
tates future research by severely cutting down computing
time. The source code of all experiments can be found at
github.com/ucsb-seclab/BullseyePoison.
2. Threat Model
Similar to the clean-label poisoning attacks proposed by
(Shafahi et al., 2018) and (Zhu et al., 2019), in our setting,
the attacker injects a small number of perturbed samples,
or poisons, into the training set of the victim. The attacker
does not have any control over the labeling process, and
the poisons are made by imperceptible changes to the orig-
inal samples. Therefore, the poisons will maintain their
malicious characteristics, despite being labeled correctly by
human experts. The attacker has no access to the victim
model, and only has knowledge of the victim’s training set
distribution (black-box setting). In the gray-box setting, the
victim network’s architecture is also known. The attacker
uses a similar training set for training substitute networks,
which will be used to craft poisons with the hope that they
are transferable to the (unseen) victim’s network.
To compare to the latest clean-label attacks (Zhu et al.,
2019), we consider two transfer learning approaches that
the victim may adopt, linear transfer learning and end-to-
end training. Transfer learning is a general approach where
a model trained for one task is reused as part of a differ-
ent model for a second task. In linear transfer learning, a
pre-trained but frozen network acts as a feature extractor
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φ, and an application-specific linear classifier is fine-tuned
on the features extracted via φ. Linear transfer learning is
shown to be a common practice, as it obtains high-quality
models without incurring the cost of training a model from
scratch (Gu et al., 2017). In end-to-end training, the feature
extractor and linear classifier are trained jointly, therefore
the feature extractor is altered after fine-tuning. Unless ex-
plicitly stated, by “attack transferability” we mean the trans-
ferability of the targeted misclassification to the victim’s
(fine-tuned) classifier where the victim’s feature extractor φ
is unknown, but the training set that is used for φ is known
to the attacker. We further evaluate the poisoning attacks in
a more limited setting where the adversary has no or partial
knowledge of the training set of φ.
Poisoning attacks may aim to cause misclassification on one
or multiple inputs. To succeed on real-world applications
such as face recognition models in surveillance systems, the
attack needs to cope with a spectrum of test inputs. To the
best of our knowledge, current clean-label poisoning attacks
only work with one image at a time, rendering them inef-
fective in more realistic attack scenarios. Bullseye Polytope
overcomes this limitation by accelerating the Convex Poly-
tope attack and improving transferability by incorporating
multiple targets into the poisoning process.
3. Related Work
A well-studied portion of data poisoning attacks aim to
use malicious data to degrade the test accuracy of the
model (Nelson et al., 2008; Biggio et al., 2012; Xiao et al.,
2012; Mei & Zhu, 2015; Burkard & Lagesse, 2017). While
such attacks are shown to be successful, they are easy to
detect, as the performance of the model can always be as-
sessed by evaluating on a private, trusted set of samples.
Another important branch of data poisoning attacks, known
as backdoor attacks (Gu et al., 2017), aim to imprint a small
number of training examples with a specific pattern (trigger)
and change their labels to the target label. During inference,
the attacker achieves misclassification by injecting the trig-
ger into targeted examples. This strategy is shown to be
effective, however, it relies on the assumption that the poi-
soned data will not be inspected by any filtering process,
human or automated. In general, similar to evasion attacks,
these attacks present the following shortcoming: they re-
quire the modification of test samples during inference to
enable misclassification.
The first clean-label poisoning attack is Feature Colli-
sion (Shafahi et al., 2018), which mainly targets linear trans-
fer learning, where the adversary has complete knowledge
of the feature extractor network φ employed by the vic-
tim. To trigger misclassification for a specific target image
xt, Feature Collision selects a base image xb from the tar-
geted class and crafts a poison sample xp by adding small
(bounded) adversarial perturbations to xb such that xp is
similar to the target image in the feature space defined by φ.
A linear classifier that is trained on the features of a dataset
containing xp will identify xt as the targeted class, since
φ(xt) ≈ φ(xp). Feature Collision suffers from two major
problems (Zhu et al., 2019); first, it tends to fail in black-box
settings, and second, in some cases, noticeable patterns of
the target image appear in the crafted poisons.
To mitigate such limitations, (Zhu et al., 2019) proposed
the Convex Polytope attack, which crafts a set of poisons
that contain the target’s feature vector within their convex
hull. Based on this characteristic, if the victim’s linear clas-
sifier associates the poisons with the targeted class, it will
label any point inside their convex hull as the targeted class.
Convex Polytope creates a larger “attack zone” in the fea-
ture space, thus increasing the chance of transferability, as
argued by the authors. In particular, it outperforms Feature
Collision by 20% on average in terms of attack success rate,
while introducing less obvious patterns in poisons. As we
will show in Section 6, Convex Polytope suffers from two
shortcomings. (1) Speed: Convex Polytope is significantly
slow. For example, crafting a set of five poisons for a single
target takes ∼17 hours on average. (2) Robustness: The
target’s feature vector tends to be close to the boundary of
the polytope formed by the poisons, leaving untapped the
full potential for attack transferability.
We design Bullseye Polytope based on the insight that by
predetermining the relative position of the target with re-
spect to the poisons’ convex hull, we can significantly speed
up the attack while also improving resiliency to unseen net-
works. Bullseye Polytope accelerates poison construction by
10-36x compared to Convex Polytope across experiments.
The generated poisons also provide higher attack success
rates in both transfer learning setups. We further improve the
robustness of Bullseye Polytope by incorporating multiple
images of a target object. We demonstrate that the resulting
attack is effective on unseen images of the target while main-
taining good baseline test accuracy on non-targeted images.
This is a vitally important feature for practical implementa-
tions on real-world systems. To the best of our knowledge,
Bullseye Polytope is the first clean-label poisoning attack
being proposed for a multi-target threat model.
4. Background
In this section, we describe the Convex Polytope attack (Zhu
et al., 2019) against transfer learning. We employ the same
notations used in their paper. Convex Polytope exploits
the following mathematical guarantee: if a linear classifier
classifies a set of poisons into the same class, lp, it will label
any input xt whose feature vector, φ(xt), lies in the convex
polytope formed by the poisons in the feature space as the
same class lp. Therefore, in the black-box setting, as long
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as xt lies inside this region in the (unknown) feature space
created by the victim model, the target will be classified with
the same label lp. In particular, Convex Polytope solves the
following optimization problem:
minimize
{c(i)},{x(j)p }
1
2
m∑
i=1
∥∥∥φ(i)(xt)−∑kj=1 c(i)j φ(i)(x(j)p )∥∥∥2∥∥φ(i)(xt)∥∥2
subject to
k∑
j=1
c
(i)
j = 1, c
(i)
j ≥ 0,∀i, j ,∥∥∥x(j)p − x(j)b ∥∥∥∞ ≤  , ∀j, (1)
where x(j)b is the original image of the j-th poison, and
 determines the maximum allowed perturbation. Notice
that Eq. 1 finds a set of poisons {x(j)p }kj=1 such that the
target lies inside, or at least close to, the convex hull of
the poisons in the feature space defined by m substitute
networks {φ(i)}mi=1. In the i-th substitute network, the tar-
get feature vector φ(i)(xt) is ideally a convex combination
of the feature vectors of poison images, i.e., φ(i)(xt) =∑k
j=1 c
(i)
j φ
(i)(x
(j)
p ), where c
(i)
j determines the coefficient
of the j-th poison in substitute network i. To solve the non-
convex and constrained problem (Eq. 1), Convex Polytope
takes the following steps in each iteration:
1. By freezing {φ(x(j)p )}kj=1, use forward-backward
splitting (Goldstein et al., 2014) to find the optimal
sets of coefficients for each individual network {c(i)}.
2. Given the optimal {c(i)}, take one gradient step to
optimize {φ(x(j)p )}kj=1.
3. Clip {x(j)p }kj=1 to the -ball around the clean base im-
ages {x(j)b }kj=1.
With  = 0.1, Convex Polytope repeats these steps for 4,000
iterations to find the optimal set of poisons.
Dropout Randomization. Attack transferability improves
when we increase the number of substitute networks for
crafting poisons. However, it is impractical to ensemble
a large number of networks due to memory and time con-
straints. For this reason, Convex Polytope leverages dropout
randomization when crafting poisons to avoid overfitting to
the feature spaces of any particular substitute network.
Ensemble Feature Collision. To evaluate the effectiveness
of the Convex Polytope attack, (Zhu et al., 2019) devel-
oped an ensemble version of Feature Collision (Shafahi
et al., 2018) to craft multiple poisons instead of one.2 They
2This was originally practiced by the authors of (Shafahi et al.,
2018) to improve performance in the end-to-end training scenario.
further used this ensemble version as a benchmark. The
corresponding loss function is defined as:
ŁFC =
m∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
∥∥∥φ(i)(x(j)p )− φ(i)(xt)∥∥∥2∥∥φ(i)(xt)∥∥2 . (2)
They argue that unlike Feature Collision, Convex Polytope’s
loss function (Eq. 1) allows the poisons to lie further away
from the target. This (1) prevents poisons from showing ap-
parent patterns resembling the target, and (2) improves trans-
ferability, as the convex polytope creates a larger space than
the ball generated by the Feature Collision attack. Experi-
ments showed that Convex Polytope outperforms Feature
Collision, especially in black-box settings.
It should be noted that, contrary to what is stated in (Zhu
et al., 2019), the Ensemble Feature Collision attack objec-
tive described by Eq. 2 is not a special case of Eq. 1 (when
the coefficients are set to 1k ), rather, it optimizes completely
decoupled objectives for different poisons. While centering
the target between poisons allows more flexibility in poison
locations, Eq. 2 pushes all poisons close to the target which
has the same drawbacks of collision attacks, namely, per-
ceptible patterns showing up in poison images and limited
transferability. By exploiting this approach of centering, we
show that Bullseye Polytope improves both attack transfer-
ability and scalability.
Scalability Issue of Convex Polytope. We observed that
when using 18 substitute networks, solving Eq. 1 for five
poisons (in 4,000 iterations) takes ∼17 hours on average.3
Of this time, step one alone takes ∼15 hours. We list the
detailed algorithm of step one in the supplementary material
(Algorithm 1). Among the listing, we noticed two major
time-consuming operations: (1) The condition that checks
whether the new coefficients result in a smaller loss than
what we have for the old coefficients. This condition is
checked in every iteration of coefficients optimization. (2)
The projection onto the probability simplex, which happens
when the new coefficients satisfy the above condition. While
we believe that there is room for improvement in the imple-
mentation of this algorithm (possibly resulting in slightly
higher loss), e.g., by checking the condition every few steps
rather than each step, we did not make any such changes in
order to avoid degradation of the attack success rate, and
allow for a fair comparison.
5. Bullseye Polytope
To tackle the scalability and transferability issue of Con-
vex Polytope, we propose Bullseye Polytope. Instead of
searching for coefficients by optimization, which is neither
efficient nor effective, Bullseye Polytope predetermines the
3With the same setting in the original paper.
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coefficients before poison crafting. More specifically, Bulls-
eye Polytope sets the coefficients to 1k to enforce that the
target resides close to the “center” of the polytope formed by
poisons in feature space.4 Bullseye Polytope then solves this
special case of the search formalization. With the Convex
Polytope attack, as soon as the target crosses the boundary
into the interior of the convex polytope of poisons, there
is no incentive to refine further and move the target deeper
inside the attack space (Figure 1). Therefore, Convex Poly-
tope often produces poisons that define a polytope whose
border is close to the target. This proximity to the boundary
reduces robustness and limits generalization. Bullseye Poly-
tope, on the other hand, improves attack transferability by
effectively pushing the target away from the polytope border
and toward its center. Also, by precluding the most time-
consuming step of computing coefficients, Bullseye Poly-
tope is an order of magnitude faster than Convex Polytope.
Formally, by setting the coefficients to 1k , Bullseye Polytope
solves the following optimization problem for single-target
mode.
minimize
{x(j)p }
1
2
m∑
i=1
∥∥∥φ(i)(xt)− 1k∑kj=1 φ(i)(x(j)p )∥∥∥2∥∥φ(i)(xt)∥∥2∥∥∥x(j)p − x(j)b ∥∥∥∞ ≤  , ∀j. (3)
Improved Transferability via Multi-Draw Dropout.
Similar to Convex Polytope, we found that activating
dropout when crafting poisons improves transferability.
With dropout, the substitute network φ(i) provides a dif-
ferent feature vector for the same poison each time. This
randomization was observed to result in much higher vari-
ance in the (training) loss of Eq. 3 compared to that of Eq. 1.
Since the solution space of Eq. 3 is much more restrictive
than Eq. 1, and moves around for different realizations of
dropout, gradient descent has a harder time converging for
Eq. 3. To tackle this problem, we optimize over the average
of multiple draws. In each iteration, we compute the feature
vector of poisons R times for each network, and use the
mean feature vectors in optimizing Eq. 3. Of course, in-
creasing R results in higher attack execution time, but even
a modest choice ofR=3 is enough to achieve a 8.5% higher
attack success rate compared to when R=1 for end-to-end
training. It should be noted that, even in this case, Bullseye
Polytope is 12 times faster than Convex Polytope. We note
here that the same technique is not applicable to Convex
Polytope as it is already very slow.
Multi-target Mode. In real-world applications, the image
acquisition process introduces variations to captured images.
These variations include, but are not limited to, lighting
4Our notion of the center coincides with the center of mass of
the poison set.
conditions and observation angle. In this light, to generate
poisons that are likely to be useful in practice, we craft poi-
sons that trigger the misclassification for all images captured
for the same object (target) by creating poisons based on a
set of different images of that object.
To craft a more generalizable attack, we consider a set of
NK target images of the same object and simply compute
the average of their target feature vectors, ν, and perform
Bullseye Polytope on ν. The intuition behind this approach
follows from the fact that (1) the pretrained network is a
powerful feature extractor, therefore, images of the same
object will be close to each other in this space, and (2) the
mean feature vector contains the most significant component
of the feature-space embedding of that object. We expect
centering poisons around ν to increase the chances of unseen
images (of the same object) falling inside the “attack zone.”
In Section 6.2, we show the effectiveness of this technique
on unseen target images.
End-to-End Training In end-to-end training, the victim
retrains both the feature extractor and the linear classifier.
After fine-tuning the whole network on the poisoned dataset,
the feature space is no longer the same as before. There-
fore, even in the white-box setting, the target feature vector
may no longer reside in the convex polytope. In gray-box
or black-box settings, such a change in the feature space
makes Convex Polytope even harder to transfer. To tackle
this issue, as inspired by Convex Polytope, we jointly ap-
ply Bullseye Polytope to multiple layers of the network.
Bullseye Polytope crafts the poisons such that the feature
space created by each layer of the network satisfies Eq. 3.
Indeed, this adds to the complexity of the problem, which is
especially problematic for the Convex Polytope attack.
6. Experiments
In this section, we first evaluate Bullseye Polytope (BP),
against Convex Polytope (CP) with the substitute networks
and datasets used in (Zhu et al., 2019) in single-target mode.
We then show the transferability of Bullseye Polytope on
unseen images of the target object by testing on multi-target
mode. BP-3x and BP-5x represent the case where multi-
draw dropout is enabled for Bullseye Polytope, with R set
to 3 and 5, respectively. Unless stated otherwise, we use the
exact same settings as used by (Zhu et al., 2019) to provide
a fair comparison.
6.1. Single-target Mode
Datasets. We use the CIFAR-10 dataset in single-target
mode. If not explicitly stated, all the substitute and victim
models are trained using the first 4,800 images from each of
the 10 classes (a total of 48,000 images). In all experiments,
we use the standard test set from CIFAR-10 to evaluate base-
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Figure 2. Distribution of coefficients (averaged over all targets
and victim networks). The coefficients are sorted, c1 denotes the
highest coefficient and c5 denotes the lowest coefficient.
line test accuracy5 of the poisoned models, and compare
them with the ordinary models (trained without poisons).
Attack targets, base images of poisons, and victim’s fine-
tuning set come from the remaining 2,000 images of the
training set. We assume victim models are fine-tuned on a
training set consisting of the first 50 images from each class,
i.e., the fine-tuning dataset, containing a total of 500 images.
The authors of (Zhu et al., 2019) randomly selected ship as
the target image class, and frog as the misclassification class.
We follow this setting for comparison fairness. Specifically,
the attacker crafts clean-label poisons from ship images to
cause a particular frog image to be misclassified as a ship.
We craft the poison images x(j)p from the first five images
of the ship class in the fine-tuning dataset. We evaluate CP
and BP on the next 50 images of the frog class to collect
statistics. It should be noted that target images, training set,
and fine-tuning set are mutually exclusive subsets. For all
experiments, we set an `∞ budget of  = 0.1.
6.1.1. LINEAR TRANSFER LEARNING
Attack Settings. For substitute networks, we use
SENet18 (Hu et al., 2018), ResNet50 (He et al., 2016),
ResNeXt29-2x64d (Xie et al., 2017), DPN92 (Chen
et al., 2017b), MobileNetV2 (Sandler et al., 2018), and
GoogLeNet (Szegedy et al., 2015). Each of these substitute
network architectures is trained with dropout probabilities
of 0.2, 0.25 and 0.3, which results in a total of 18 substitute
models. To evaluate the attacks under gray-box settings,
we use the aforementioned architectures (although trained
with a different random seed). To test under black-box set-
tings, we use two new architectures, ResNet18 (He et al.,
2016) and DenseNet121 (Huang et al., 2017). Dropout re-
mains activated when crafting the poisons to improve attack
transferability. However, all eight victim models are trained
without dropout, and dropout is disabled when evaluating
on them. We perform both CP and BP attacks for 4,000 iter-
ations with the same hyperparameters used by CP. The only
5Accuracy on non-targeted images.
difference is that BP forces the coefficients to be uniform,
i.e., c(i)j =
1
5 . We use Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014) with a
learning rate of 0.1 to fine-tune the victim models on the
poisoned dataset for 60 epochs.
Attack Success Rate. Figure 6 shows the progress of CP
and BP over the number of iterations of the attack. For
each individual victim network, the attack progress of CP
and BP is provided in supplementary material (Figure 13).
As Figure 3a shows, Bullseye Polytope outperforms CP
on average (over victim models), and converges faster. In
particular, on average over all iterations, BP-3x and BP-5x
demonstrate 7.44% and 8.38% higher attack success rates
than CP. Both CP and BP hardly affect the baseline test
accuracy of models (Figure 5a).
Attack Execution Time. BP is almost 21 times faster than
CP, as it excludes the computation-heavy step of optimizing
the coefficients. Figure 4a shows the attack execution time
based on the number of iterations. Running CP for 4,000
iterations takes 1,002 minutes on average, while BP takes
only 47 minutes. BP-3x and BP-5x take 88 and 141 minutes
respectively. It is worth noting that BP needs fewer iterations
than CP to achieve the same attack success rate (Figure 6).
6.1.2. END-TO-END TRAINING
In end-to-end training, the victim feature extractor is
changed after the fine-tuning process, which results in a
(slightly) different feature space. This causes the conven-
tional CP attack to have poor transferability of less than 5%
when the entire network is retrained (Zhu et al., 2019). To
tackle this problem, (Zhu et al., 2019) extends CP to create
convex polytopes in different layers of the substitute models.
We follow the same strategy for BP.
Attack Settings. We perform CP and BP for only 1,500 it-
erations due to time and resource constraints. For substitute
networks, we use SENet18, ResNet50, ResNeXt29-2x64d,
and DPN92, with dropout values of 0.2, 0.25, and 0.3, which
results in a total of 12 substitute models. For gray-box
testing, we evaluate attack transferability against all four
aforementioned architectures. MobileNetV2, GoogLeNet,
ResNet18, and DenseNet121 are used as victim networks in
the black-box setting. We use Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014)
with a learning rate of 10−4 to fine-tune the victim models
on the poisoned dataset for 60 epochs.
Attack Success Rate. Similar to what we observed for lin-
ear transfer learning (but with a wider margin), BP presents
higher attack transferability than CP, especially in the black-
box setting. Here we report attack success rates after 1,500
iterations. BP and BP-3x improve attack transferability by
18.25% and 26.75% (Figure 3b). Figure 14 in supplemen-
tary material shows the attack success rates against each
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Figure 3. Attack success rates of CP, BP, BP-3x and BP-5x, averaged over all eight victim models.
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Figure 4. Attack execution time.
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Figure 5. Average change in baseline test accuracy of models.
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Figure 6. Linear transfer learning - success rates of CP, BP, BP-3x and BP-5x on victim models. Notice ResNet18 and DenseNet121
are the black-box setting.
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Figure 7. Attack transferability to unseen angles against linear transfer learning.
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Figure 8. Attack transferability to unseen angles for BP and BP-3x (averaged over all eight victim models).
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individual victim model. BP and BP-3x have 10-30% and
10-50% higher attack transferability than CP, respectively
(except against GoogLeNet). Poor transferability against
GoogLeNet is also reported for CP (Zhu et al., 2019). Since
the GoogLeNet architecture differs significantly from the
substitute models, it is, therefore, more difficult for the
“attack zone” to survive end-to-end training. For other black-
box models (MobileNetV2, ResNet18, and DenseNet121),
BP and BP-3x improve attack transferability by ∼18% and
∼24% respectively. Both CP and BP have hardly any effect
on the baseline test accuracy of models (Figure 5b).
Attack Execution Time. Figure 4b shows attack execution
time. While BP and BP-3x take 15 and 98 minutes, CP takes
1,180 minutes, which is 36x slower than BP.
6.1.3. TRANSFERABILITY TO UNSEEN TRAINING SETS
Until now, we have assumed that the substitute models are
trained on the same training set (Ψ) on which the victim’s
feature extractor network is trained. In this section, we
evaluate CP and BP using substitute models that are trained
on a training set which has (1) zero or (2) 50% overlap with
Ψ. Such a setting is more realistic compared to when the
attacker has complete knowledge of Ψ.
Attack Settings. We use the same setting as in linear trans-
fer learning except for the following changes. We train the
victim models on the first 2,400 images of each class. In
the zero overlap setting, substitute models are trained on
samples indexed from 2,401 to 4,800 per each class. For
the 50% overlap setting, we train all substitute models on
samples indexed from 1,201 to 3,600 for each class.
Attack Success Rate. Figure 9 shows attack success rates
(averaged over victims) for both zero overlap and 50% over-
lap setups. When we have 50% overlap, BP, BP-3x, and
BP-5x demonstrate 5.82%, 8.56%, and 9.27% higher attack
success rates compared to CP (on average over all itera-
tions), with BP converging significantly faster than CP. For
the zero overlap setup, BP provides hardly any improvement
over CP. They both achieve much lower attack success rates
of 20-25%. It should be noted that the zero overlap scenario
is much more restricted than what is usually assumed in
threat models of poisoning attacks. The victim’s network,
training set, and even the fine-tuning training set (except, of
course, the poisoned samples) are all unseen to the adver-
sary. CP, BP, BP-3x, and BP-5x hardly affect the baseline
test accuracy of models (Figure 18 in supplementary).
6.1.4. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BULLSEYE IDEA
We have argued that the effectiveness (robustness and trans-
ferability) of BP stems from the fact that predetermining
the convex coefficients as uniform weights draws the target
to the “center” of the attack zone, increasing its distance
from the poison polytope boundary. In order to evaluate this
claim quantitatively, we run the attack with different sets of
nonuniform coefficients, to see if the improvement is truly
due to target centering (i.e., the “bullseye” idea) or simply
from “fixing” the coefficients instead of searching for them.
We evaluate BP against nine alternatives {BP′t}9t=1, each
with a different set of positive predefined coefficients that
satisfy
∑k
j=1cj = 1. Figure 10 depicts a geometrical ex-
ample for each set (sorted from left to right based on the
entropy of the coefficient vector), with BP having the high-
est possible entropy of log2 5 ' 2.32. As Figure 11 shows,
variations of BP with higher coefficient entropy generally
demonstrate higher attack success rates compared to those
with smaller entropy, especially in the black-box setting.
This finding indicates that predetermining the coefficients to
uniform weights (BP) is preferable to simply fixing them to
some other plausible values. This backs our intuition behind
BP that the further the target is from the polytope boundary,
the lower its chances of jumping out of the attack zone in
the victim’s feature space. In fact, the average entropy of co-
efficients in CP roughly converges to 1.70, which means the
coefficient distribution is more skewed with some poisons
having a relatively small contribution to the attack. Figure 2
shows the mean values of the (sorted) coefficients to provide
a sense of the coefficient distributions produced by CP.
6.2. Multi-Target Mode
We now consider a more realistic setting where the target
object is known but there is unpredictable variability in
the target image at test time (e.g., unknown observation
angle, lighting, etc.). This is the first attempt at crafting a
clean-label and training-time dataset poisoning attack that
is effective on multiple (unseen) images of the target object
at test time. To this end, we consider a slight variation of
Bullseye Polytope that takes multiple images of the target
object (capturing as much observation variability as possi-
ble) and performs Bullseye Polytope on the averages of their
feature vectors in all substitute networks.
Targets’ Dataset. We use the Multi-View Car
Dataset (Ozuysal et al., 2009), which contains images from
20 different cars as they are rotated by 360 degrees at in-
crements of 3-4 degrees. Multi-View Car Dataset contains
a different distribution of images compared to CIFAR-10,
therefore we expect to see lower test accuracy when testing
the substitute models on this dataset. Out of all 20 cars, the
substitute models present an accuracy of over 90% for 14 of
the cars. We perform the attacks only for these 14 cars to get
a lower-bound estimation of the performance of our attack,
as for the other targets the models are more vulnerable, and
thus easier to trick. We use the same settings and parameters
as single-target mode.
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Figure 9. Comparison of CP, BP, and BP-3x in linear transfer learning, with zero and 50% overlap between training sets of the substitute
networks and the victim’s network.
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Figure 11. Comparison between BP and the other nine alternatives described at Figure 10.
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We evaluate both CP and BP setting the number of target
images, NK , to 1, 5, and 10, in order to verify the effect of
NK on the attack robustness against unseen angles. Note
that when NK = 1, the attack is in single-target mode. To
select the NK target images for poison crafting, we take one
image every 360NK degree rotation of the target car. Figure 7
and Figure 8 show the attack success rates against unseen
images. In linear transfer learning, using five targets instead
of one improves attack robustness against unseen angles by
over 16%. For end-to-end training, BP-3x demonstrates an
improvement of 12%. When NK = 5, we observed that
BP achieves 14% higher attack success rate compared to
CP, while being 59x faster. We note that the total number
of poisons crafted for multi-target attacks is the same as
single-target mode (i.e., 5).
7. Conclusions
In this work, we present a scalable and transferable clean-
label poisoning attack, Bullseye Polytope, for transfer learn-
ing. Bullseye Polytope searches for poisons that create, in
the feature space, a convex polytope around the target image,
ensuring that a linear classifier that trains on the poisoned
dataset will classify the target into the poison class. By
predetermining the relative position of the target and the
polytope, Bullseye Polytope achieves 10-36x faster poison
generation compared to the state-of-the-art attack, Convex
Polytope. By driving the polytope center close to the target,
Bullseye Polytope outperforms Convex Polytope’s attack
success rate by 7.44% and 26.75% for linear transfer learn-
ing and end-to-end training, respectively. Furthermore, by
including multiple images of the same target object when
crafting the poisons, Bullseye Polytope shows attack trans-
ferability of 49.56% against unseen images (of the same
object). This is 16% improvement compared to single-target
mode when testing against the same set of images without
increasing the number of poisons.
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A. Coefficients Optimization Step in Convex
Polytope
Algorithm 1 Convex Polytope - Coefficients Updating
1: Input: A← {φ(x(j)p )}kj=1
2: α← 1‖ATA‖
3: for i = 1 to m do
4: while not converged do
5: ĉ(i) ← c(i) − αAT (Ac(i) − φ(i)(xt))
6: if loss(ĉ(i)) ≥ loss(c(i)) then
7: α← 1α
8: else
9: c(i) ← ĉ(i)
10: project c(i) onto the probability simplex.
11: end if
12: end while
13: end for
In each iteration, Convex Polytope performs three steps.
We observed that step one takes significant amount of time
compared to the other two steps. Algorithm 1 shows the
details of step one, which searches for the (most) suitable
coefficients for the current poisons at the time.
B. Single-Target Mode
B.1. Linear Transfer Learning
Figure 13 shows the attack success rates of CP, BP, BP-3x
and BP-5x, against each individual victim model.
B.2. End-to-End Training
Figure 14 shows the attack success rates of CP, BP, BP-3x
and BP-5x, against each individual victim model end-to-end
training victims. Among them, the last row presents the
black-box setting. We note that none of CP, BP, and BP-3x
shows attack transferability for GoogLeNet. (Zhu et al.,
2019) has made a similar observation. They argued that
since GoogLeNet has a more different architecture than the
substitute models, it is more difficult for the “attack zone”
to survive end-to-end training.
B.3. Effectiveness of Bullseye Idea
Figure 15 shows the attack success rates of BP and the other
nine alternatives, which are described at Sectionbullseye-
effectiveness.
C. Implementation Details
Convex Polytope authors released the source code of CP
along with the substitute networks. 6 We used their imple-
mentation directly for comparison. For all experiments, we
use PyTorch-v1.3.1 over Cuda 10.1. We run all the
attacks using NVIDIA Titan RTX graphics cards. For
solving Eq. 1 (Convex Polytope) and Eq. 3 (Bullseye Poly-
tope), we used the similar settings and parameters to what
is practiced by (Zhu et al., 2019).
6All models are trained with the same architecture and hyper-
parameters defined in https://github.com/kuangliu/,
except for dropout.
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Figure 12. Poisons crafted by Convex Polytope and Bullseye Polytope attacks. First row shows the original images selected for crafting
the poisons.
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Figure 13. Linear transfer learning: Success rates of CP, BP, BP-3x and BP-5x, against each individual victim model.
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Figure 14. End-to-end training: Success rates of CP, BP, BP-3x and BP-5x, against each individual victim model. Notice GoogLeNet,
MobileNetV2, ResNet18 and DenseNet121 are the black-box setting.
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Figure 15. Linear transfer learning: Success rates of BP and the other nine alternatives described at Section 6.1.4, against each individual
victim model.
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Figure 16. Linear transfer learning when we have 50% overlap between the training sets of substitute and victim’s networks: Success rates
of CP, BP and BP-3x, against each individual victim model.
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(a) Zero overlap
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Figure 17. Attack execution time.
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Figure 18. Average decrease in baseline test accuracy of models
in linear transfer learning settings, when there is zero or 50% over-
lap between training sets of the substitute networks and victim’s
network.
